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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOHN R. MITCHELL,

Appellant,
vs.
MERLIN C. PALMER, FLOYD
PALMER, JOHN FRANK PALMER, DAVE CLAIR PALMER
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The action was commenced by the appellant in the
lower court against the respondents, children of the
appellant's wife by a prior marriage, to rescind two
warranty deeds as having been procured by fraud and
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false representations. The appellant also sought to
recover Two Thousand Five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars as the proceeds of two Postal Savings Notes owned
by the appellant's wife and the mother of respondents,
which notes were cashed and the proceeds given to the
respondents allegedly because of false representations
(R. 1-4).
The respondents in answer to the complaint denied
any fraud or misrepresentations and alleged as an affirmative defense that the property conveyed by the deeds
rhallenged by the appellant was purchased with the
proceeds received from the sale of the Idaho property
owned by the respondents and if the deeds were held
invalid, the respondents requested the court to impress
a trust upon the property in their favor (R. 18-19).
The court held that the appellant had no interest
in the postal notes and granted a non-suit as to them
at the close of the appellant's case (R. 124). After final
submission of the case the court held that there had
been no fraud or false misrepresentations made by the
respondents and upheld the challenged deeds as being
valid. Since the court found that the deeds were valid
and subsisting, it ruled that the question of impressing
a trust upon the property was, therefore, moot (R. 235).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as contained in the brief of
appellant is substantially correct; however, the respond-
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ents feel that additional faets should be called to the
attention of the court.
In 1937, after the death of the respondent's father,
at a tin1e when all of the respondents were of age, Mrs.
Mitchell, the mother of the respondents, and who in
1943 became the wife of the appellant, conveyed certain
Idaho property owned by her to Floyd Palmer as Trustee
for the benefit of himself and his other brothers and
sister, reserving a life estate in her favor (Ex. 16).
Shortly after the marriage of the appellant and the
mother of the respondents, one of the homes on the
Idaho property as above mentioned was sold to a Mr.
and ~Irs. Hendricks for the sum of Seven Thousand
($7,000.00) Dollars (R. 130, Ex. 6). At this time all of
the children gave quit claim deeds on the property to
their mother to enable her to 1nake the sale (Ex. 5),
all of which was known by the appellant (R. 131). A
down payment of Two Thousand ( $2,000.00) Dollars was
made by the Hendricks with which the mother of the
respondents purchased a Postal Savings Note in the
same amount (R. 50, 51). The balance of the contract
was paid at the rate of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars per month
plus interest and on December 30, 1946, a payment of
Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty-Three and 97 jlOO
($2,553.97) Dollars was received in full on the contract
(Ex. 13, R. 174).
In September of 1946, the second home on the Idaho
property was sold to a Mr. Thomas Paln1er for a purchase price of Ten Thousand Five Hundred ($10,500.00)
Dollars cash (R. 133). At the time of this sale quit
elaim deeds were again obtained from the respondents
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with the knowledge of the appellant (R. 134) and at
that time the appellant and Mrs. Mitchell moved to Salt
Lake City and purchased a home referred to as the
Garfield Avenue property for the sum of Six Thousand
Seven Hundred F·orty-Seven and 84/100 ($6,747.84)
Dollars (R. 135). In December of the same year they
purchased a home on Wilmington A venue referred to
as the Wilmington property for a purchase price of
Eight Thousand Five Hundred ($8,500.00) Dollars (Ex.
11, R. 136). At the time of the sale of the second home
in Idaho Mrs. :Mitchell purchased a second Postal Savings Note in the sum of Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars
( R. 51). The balance of the proceeds received from the
sale of the second home in Idaho was applied on the
purchase of the homes in Salt Lake City.
The parties, through their attorneys, stipulated after
an examination of the bank statements of the appellant
and Mrs. Mitchell that com1nencing with August 31,
1946, at which time there was a balance of $1,841.60 in
their joint checking account in the First Security Bank
of Idaho at Preston, Idaho, all deposits subsequent to
said date and until the Salt Lake properties were paid
for were made by ~1:rs. ~Etchell (R. 173-175). The more
substantial ones were as follows: $2,553.97 on December
30, 1946 (Ex. 13) and $9,920.20 on September 24, 1946
(Ex. 14). Assuming equal ownership of the $1,841.60
balance the most the appellant could have contributed
to the purchase of the Salt Lake property was $920.80.
At the time of n1:rs. Mitchell's death there was a balance
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in the joint account of $2,164.68 (Ex. 15 ), which appellant retained and most of which was derived from the
sale of the Garfield property.
According to the respondents, at the time they
executed quit claim deeds conveying the Idaho property
back to their nwther for the purpose of selling the same,
it was understood among them and their mother that
when she purchased the property in Salt Lake City,
title to the same would be held in the san1e manner as
title had previously been held to the Idaho property
(R. 169).
'Vl1en the Salt Lake property was purchased, title
was taken in the name of the appellant and Mrs. Mitchell
as joint tenants. During the early part of 1948 and on
numerous other occasions, Mrs. :Mitchell told Joel Hart,
an attorney who had prepared the papers concerning the
Idaho property, that she wanted the Salt Lake property
to he fixed up the same way that the Idaho property had
been (R. 158-162). On Decoration Day of 1948, Mrs.
Mitchell was too ill to go to Preston, Idaho and as a
result thereof Mr. Floyd Palmer came to Salt Lake City
on the 31st day of May, 1948, to see how his mother was
getting along. During this visit Mrs. Mitchell told Floyd
Palmer in the presenca of the appellant and Merlin
Palmer that she would like to have the property fixed
up the same way the Idaho property had been (R. 178,
202). As requested deeds were prepared conveying the
Salt Lake homes to Floyd Palmer as Trustee, reserving
a life estate in the appellant in the Wilmington Avenue
home (Ex. D, E). The~e are the deeds which the appel-
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lant seeks to set aside as having been obtained by fraud
and misrepresentation.
The deeds were signed by the mother of the respondents at her home in the presence of the appellant and
Merlin Palmer (R. 183). The appellant admits that he
signed some documents at that time, but that he did
not know they were deeds. Instead he claims he thought
they were papers rnaking Floyd Palmer Trustee of the
postal notes.

The respondents maintained that after

l\frs. Mitchell signed the deeds, the appellant and Merlin
Palmer went to the Hart l\fusic Company in Sugar House
and the appellant there signed the deeds in the presence
of Joel Hart and Merlin Palmer (R. 184). After the
execution and acknowledgment had been made, the deeds
were handed to Merlin Palmer in the presence of the
appellant (R. 185), and from that time on Merlin Palmer
retained complete control and dominion over the same,
even though they were deposited in a safety deposit
box held in the names of himself and Mr. and Mrs.
}[itchell (R. 192-193).
STA':rEl\1ENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE
DEEDS WERE VALID IN ALL RESPECTS (REPLY TO
APPELLANT'S POINTS 1, 2 AND 4).
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POINT JI.
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT EVEN
ING THE DEEDS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO
CORDED THAT FACT WOULD NOT AFFECT
VALIDITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE
(REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT 3)

ASSUMBE RETHEIR
DEEDS

POINT I.
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE
DEEDS WERE VALID IN ALL RESPECTS (REPLY TO
APPELLANT'S POINTS 1, 2 AND 4)

At the close of the trial, the court took the matter
tmder advisement and subsequently dictated a decision.
This decision was relied upon by counsel for the respondents as being sufficient to constitute Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and a judgment was prepared
based thereon. Part of the court's decision is as follows:
"The first question presented is as to the
validity of the two warrantv deeds set forth in
plaintiff's complaint, and ~hich plaintiff seeks
to have declared null and void on the grounds
that said plaintiff's signature to said deeds was
obtained by fraud and misrepresentation on the
part of the defendants. The court sees no escape
from the conclusion, and has no doubt, about the
fact that the plaintiff, when he signed the two
deeds involved in the action, being Exhibits D
and E, sig-ned the deeds knm:ving-ly and willingly,
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and there were no misrepresentations as to the
nature or contents of the instrument made by
the defendants, or any of them; and the deeds,
when signed, were complete except for the signatures of the grantors and the jurat of the notary;
the court finds that the plaintiff knew and intended, when said instruments were executed, to
convey to the grantee named therein any and all
interest he had in the property described in the
deeds, re:::;erving only to himself a life estate in
what is referred to as the Wilmington property,
being Exhibit D; that said deeds are valid and
subsisting deeds, and the plaintiff has a life estate
in the Wilmington property described in Exhibit
D." (R. 234).
It appears from the above statement that the decision rendered by the trial court was without any reservations or hesitancy as to what the facts established.

Since the errors urged by the appellant in Points 1,
2 and 4 are prirnarily concerned with the sufficiency of
the evidence and the court having found in favor of the
respondents the rule on appeal is fundamental that if
there is any competent evidence to support the decision
of the trial court said decision will be affirmed.
Only a portion of the evidence which supports the
judgment of the trial court is reviewed herein. Joe~
Hart testified as follows upon cross-examination concerning a conversation had with 1\irs. Mitchell at the
time he prepared the deeds quit claiming the Idaho
property back to Mrs. Mitchell:
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""Q. \Vho gave you the instructions and the direction to fill in those portions of each of these
deeds which you have testified to having filled
in'
A. .Mrs ..Mitehell, originally.
Q. At the ti1ne the deed8 were made·~
A. At the ti1ne the property was * * * the deeds
in Idaho were n1ade. * * *
Q. \V ell, that * * *
A. * * * conveying away the property.
Q. That was the deeds in Idaho, is that correct~
..:\.. But she mentioned that she wanted this property she was going to buy in Salt Lake fixed
up the same way as the property was in
Idaho.
Q. \V ell, that was in Idaho she said that, wasn't
it~

A.

It was in Idaho in view of property, or contelnplated buying in Ptal1." (R. 169)

After the appellant and Mrs. Mitchell had purchased
the property in Salt Lake the same witness testified concerning a further conversation with Mrs. Mitchell and
in the presence of the appellant, which occurred at the
Sugar House Music Company in approximately :t:ebruary
or April of 1947 (R. 158-162). His testimony is as follows:
"Mrs. Mitchell mentioned to me that she
would like to have her property fixed. up in the
same manner which the Idaho property had been
fixed, so that the children would be named as""""""
or so that Floyd would be named * "" * Floyd
Palmer "" * "" would be named as Trustee for the
rfl~t

of thfl {'hilrlrfln." (R. 162)
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Mr. Hart testified that he had other such conversations with Mrs. Mitchell (R. 162).
Merlin Palmer, one of the respondents, testified
concerning a conversation had with his mother on May
31, 1948, in the presence of the appellant and his brother
Floyd Palmer. Part of the conversation is as follows:
"Mother said that she would like the property
put in the trusteeship in the same fashion it had
been in Preston, Idaho-on the Preston, Idaho
property-with Floyd as Trustee and all the rest
of the children in it under him." (R. 178)
In this same conversation the witness further testified
that the appellant stated as follows:
"He said that all he wanted was a place to
stay for the rest of his life, and mother said the
same thing." (R. 179)
Mr. Palmer further testified that at the request of
his mother the appellant secured an envelope (Ex. 12)
containing the deeds to both pieces of property from
which legal descriptions were secured for the preparation of the deeds which the appellant seeks to have
rescinded ( R. 180-181).
Concerning the conversation on May 31 at the Wilmington home in the presence of the appellant, Floyd
Palmer ·testified that his mother stated as follows:
" 'Floyd, while you are down here, I would
like to have this property fixed the same as the
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Idaho property was,' she says, ·I have just
neglected doing it.' She said, 'I have been up to
illr. Richard's office once, going to have him do
it, but he wasn't in.' She said, 'Mr. :Mitchell and
I went up, but he wasn't there,' and otherwise
she just neglected having it done. She said, 'I
would like to have this fixed up just as soon as
possible.'" (R. 202)
Floyd Palmer further testified concerning this conversation:
"~lother stated, she says, 'I want this property fixed the same as it was in Idaho, or in
Preston, but,' she says, 'in Preston, he had no
life estate,' but she says, 'here, I would like to
make Rome provision where he would have a place
to live.' At that instant, Mr. l\1:itchell looked up;
he was sitting in n1y father's over-stuffed leather
chair; he looked up, he says, 'Yes, all I want is a
place to live.' " (R. 202)

After the deeds had been prepared Merlin Palmer
testified that Joel Hart placed one small cross on the
deeds indicating the place where Mrs. Mitchell was to
sign the deeds (R. 182, Ex. DE). Mr. Palmer then took
the deeds to his mother's home where she signed them
as indicated, after which Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Palmer
returned to the Sugar House Music Company and Mr.
Mitchell signed the deeds in the presence of Merlin
Palmer and Joel Hart (R. 183, 184). After Mr. Mitchell
signed the deeds and they were notarized by Mr. Hart,
the deeds were given to Mr. Palmer in the presence of
.Mr. Mitchell (R. 185).
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Concerning the credibility of the appellant's testimony and in corroboration of respondents' evidence the
appellant himself admits signing an agreement (Ex. 1)
soon after the death of Mrs. Mitchell which recites that
furniture, household fixtures, appliances, etc., "will be
held intact until dissolution of the life estate." Although
the appellant claims he did not read the first part of the
agreement he did check the listing of the items thereon
and admits that he told the respondents that the furniture should stay with the house because he needed them
(R. 60). At the same time, the appellant signed an agreement with the respondents (Ex. 2) by which it was agreed
that the respondents would make no claims upon the
bank account; however, the appellant was to pay all of
the hospital and doctor bills pertaining to Mrs. Mitchell's
last illness and the expense of burial, etc.
The appellant further admits that he did not receive
any payments except one after Mrs. Mitchell's death from
the purchasers of the Garfield Avenue property (R. 27).
On l\farch 25, 1949, a letter was written to the appellant
by Floyd Palmer, one of the respondents (Ex. 3), in
which Mr. Pahner makes a demand for the $60.00 payment received by the appellant after Mrs. :Mitchell's
death and further states in the letter as follows:
"As to the life estate you have in the Wilmington property, you are to keep all expenses
up on this property, also fire insurance."
In this same letter it is suggested that the respondents would build the appellant a home to live in at
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Preston, Idaho, having in 1nind selling the \Yilmington
Avenue property. Although the appellant admits receiving this letter and discussing with Floyd Palmer the
suggestion that he move to Idaho and also admits writing a card dated ~lay 2, 1949 (Ex. 5), in which he tells
.Mr. Floyd Pahner that he has decided to stay in Salt
Lake, the appellant testified that he did not know anything about the deeds and the life estate reserved to hirn
until the early part of 1950 when a real estate agent
investigated the records at the t!~'t;l~
· "/ liecorder's office
(R. 43). In view of this and other evidence, it is obvious
that the court was justified, if not con1pelled, to hold
that the appellant intended to 1nake the conveyance
shown by the deeds, which lack of intent is urged as
error in the first point of the appellant's brief.
The ~econd point questions the issue of delivery of
the deeds. It is not disputed that the appellant did in
fact deliver the documents which he signed; however,
the appellant's position would appear to be that although
there was a delivery in fact, such a delivery was not
valid in law since it was obtained by fraud. But since
the court found "there was no misrepresentation as to
the nature or content of the instrument" and that the
appellant signed the deeds "knowingly and willingly"
and intended to convey any and all interest he had in
the property except the life estate, it is obvious that the
delivery in fact was a good delivery at law.
The appellant also challenged the delivery of the
deeds on the ground that the grantors retained some
control over the sarne. According to the respondents,
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after the signing of the deeds at the Hart Music Company in Sugar House, Joel Hart then handed them to
Merlin Palmer in the presence of the appellant (R. 171,
185). Merlin Palmer then deposited the deeds in a safety
deposit borx to which he and the appellant and Mrs.
Mitchell all had access (R. 192-3). This Honorable Court
has held that if there is a valid delivery initially, the
fact that the deed is left in a place equally accessible
to the grantors and grantees will not render the delivery
invalid. Wilson v. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 176, 89 P. 643;
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 438, 29 P. 2nd 355.
The appellant also offered evidence to the effect
that the deeds were not recorded because there was a
possibility that the Wilmington property would be sold
and the proceeds used to purchase a duplex for Mrs.
Mitchell which would give her a place to live and income
during her life. It is not disputed that such was the
reason for not recording the deeds; however, the respondents submit that such fact does not support the
contention that there was not a valid delivery. Respondents were dealing with their mother and if she would
have been happier in a duplex, they naturally were willing to transfer their interest in the two homes into a
duplex subject to a life estate.
At the time of the sale of the Idaho property it was
an inconvenience to prepare and secure quit claim deeds
from all of the children. At the time of the conveyance
of the Salt Lake property to the respondents there was
a "For Sale" sign on the Wilmington property and the
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..

·

possibility of a sale was anticipated... If the deeds were
recorded, it would again be inconvenient to secure deeds
from all of the children if the transfer of interests were
made upon the purchase of a duplex. No doubt the
respondents and their mother contemplated that if a
sale were made, the deeds would be cancelled and new
deeds prepared arranging title in the smne manner on
the duplex. However, this possibility was in no way
~sserted as a condition upon the delivery of the deeds.
The request not to record the deeds does not without
more constitute a conditional delivery of the san1e.
In Trilson v. W,ilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 P. 643, the
father as grantor had deeds prepared conveying numerous tracts of land to his sons and had the deeds given
to one of the grantees who placed them in a safety deposit box to which the grantor also had access. The
grantor re1nained in possession of the residence, which
was conveyed by one of the deeds, and otherwise participated and lived off from the business also conveyed
to the sons.
In Woolley v. Taylor, 45 Utah 227, 144 P. 1094, a
father had a deed prepared conveying his home to his
daughter, which deed was given to the grantee after
execution and acknowledgment but was not recorded
until after the grantor's death. During the remainder
of the grantor's life he resided in the home, paid the
insurance and taxes, and made improvements thereon.
In Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 355,
the grantor had a deed prepared conveying the property
to her sister. The conveyancer thought he gave the
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deed back to the grantor after acknowledging her signature. The deed was kept in a safety deposit box in the
name of the grantor; however, both the grantor and
grantee went to the box together on numerous occasions.
There was testimony that after the date of the deed the
grantor stated she wanted to sell the property. Also
the grantor paid the insurance and taxes until her death.
After the grantor's death the grantee stated that she
did not know whether the place was hers or whether it
went to someone else.
In all three cases the Supreme Court held there was
a valid delivery. In the Chamberlain case the trial court
held there was not a valid delivery, which ruling was
reversed on appeal. In these cases the court has stated
two rules which should be applied to this case.
First: That a deed duly executed and acknowledged
and shown to be in the possession of the grantee is selfproving both as to the execution and delivery and the
presumption raised by such facts can only be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence.
Second: That a delivery may be made which is
sufficient to convey a present interest to be enjoyed in
the future. Such being the case continued acceptance
of the benefits and assumption of the burdens of the
property by the grantor is not inconsistent, especially
when a family relation exists, with a valid delivery of the
deeds.
After reviewing the file in this action having in mind
the law developed in the three cases mentioned above,
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the conclusion that the trial court correctly decided the
case cannot be denied.
Point 4 of the appellant's brief claims there was
error in not considering the question of intent and
delivery of the deeds which is obviously the same issue
raised by Points 1 and 2 as herein discussed. In line
with the recent Utah Supre1ne Court case of Morley v.
W,illde11, et al., :2~15 P. 2d 500, it appears sufficient to
state that, "A careful examination thereof (the record)
leads us to conclude that the trial court's findings and
decision are supported by a fair preponderance of the
evidence and should remain undisturbed, * * * "
POINT II.
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT EVEN ASSUMING THE DEEDS CHALLENGED HEREIN WERE NOT
ENTITLED TO BE RECORDED THAT FACT WOULD NOT
AFFECT THEIR VALIDITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO
THE DEEDS (REPLY TO APPELLANT'S POINT 3).

1.

The court in its decision stated as follows:
"Questions have been raised about the deeds
not being certified or acknowledged in the ways
provided by the statutes of Utah. So far as this
case is concerned, that matter is of no consequence, as an acknowledgment is not necessary
to the validity of a deed as between the parties,
and is a requirement merely with respect to
recordation." (R. 235)

There can he no question but what the

court'~

deci-
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sion, as quoted above correctly states the law in Utah.
Title 78, Chapter 1, Section 6, 1943, Utah Code Annotated as amended provides in part as follows :
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every
instrument of writing setting forth an agreement
to convey any real estate or whereby any real
estate may be affected, to operate as notice to
third persons shall be proved or acknowledged
and certified in the manner prescribed by this
title and recorded in the office of the Recorder
of the County in whiCh such real estate is situated, but shall be valid and binding between the
parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to other persons who have had actual notice."
This provision of the present law is substantially
identical with a similar section of the earlier laws of
Utah as construed in Murray -v. Beal, 23 Utah 548, 65
P. 726, which held that an instrument need not be validly
acknowledged in order to be effective between the parties.
CONCLUSION
The evidence not only fails to show by clear and
convincing proof that there was no delivery of the deeds
or that the appellant did not intend to convey the property, but rather the court was compelled to find that the
appellant knowingly and willingly made the conveyances
and that there was a valid delivery of the deeds. The
decision as dicta ted by the court shows the court had
no doubt concerning the facts established by the evi-
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dence. Considering the statutory and case law of Utah,
it is manifest that the decision of the court based upon
such facts was legally compelled. The decision required
by the record and the law is likewise a fair and equitable
determination of the case and therefore should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS & BIRD AND
DAN S. BUSHNELL,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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